Why do labor unions resist economic restructuring and adjustment policies in some countries and in some economic sectors while they submit in other cases? And why do some labor leaders fashion more creative and effective roles for labor unions? This book addresses these critical questions in an in-depth elegant comparative study of Argentina, Mexico, and Venezuela in the 1990s. In each case, this book studies the role of both national confederations and individual unions in specific economic sectors in each country. It demonstrates the importance of the presence and nature of alliances between political parties and labor unions and the significance of competition between labor unions for the representation of the same set of workers. This work opens new horizons for appreciating the intellectual and practical importance of the variation in the interactions between workers, unions, political parties, and economic policies. 
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A catalog record for this book is available from the British Library. Interviews 237 Index 243 Presidents leading populist labor-based parties came to power almost simultaneously in Argentina, Mexico, and Venezuela in the late 1980s. Although their respective parties promoted protectionism and state intervention in the postwar period, once in office all three presidents advanced trade liberalization and state retrenchment. The parallel convergence of labor-based parties into neoliberalism challenged the policies on which their long-term alliance with labor unions had been built. Despite the strong partisan loyalties between labor and governing parties in all three countries, labor reactions to this common challenge were diverse and so was the permeability of governments to labor demands. Moreover, the patterns of union-government interactions in Argentina, Mexico, and Venezuela varied not only across the three countries, but also across economic sectors within each country. Some unions endorsed marketoriented reforms whereas others rejected these policies. Sometimes unions were able to exercise policy input and other times the government ignored labor demands. Political dynamics are crucial to understand the interaction between unions and labor-based governments implementing market reforms. First, in a context of economic uncertainty, partisan loyalties made unions more likely to restrain their militancy when partisan allies were in the government. Secondly, leadership or partisan competition for the control of unions increased the incentives for militancy. Even loyal union leaders who believed that workers' discontent about their collaboration with the government would lead to their own replacement become more militant. Additionally, interunion competition for membership created incentives for labor unions to break their own coordination efforts in their bids for affiliates, thus weakening all of them and reducing government's incentives There are many people and institutions who aided and encouraged me to undertake and carry out this project. Although mentioning them will not pay my debt to them, it gives me a chance to acknowledge it. My interest in politics, labor, and unions emerged in my adolescence during the Argentine transition to democracy. It took a more analytic turn when I began the study of political science at the Universidad de Buenos Aires. At that stage, several Argentine scholars inspired my interest in different ways including Atilio Borón, Claudia Hilb, Guillermo O'Donnell, and Juan Carlos Portantiero. During my years as a graduate student at Harvard University, I benefited from the guidance and support of my advisor, Jorge I. Domínguez. Jorge taught me the many complications of searching for general arguments to understand the complex diversity of political phenomena while keeping my enthusiasm for the study of politics. Alberto Alesina, Robert Bates, Peter Hall, and Deborah Yashar also provided crucial intellectual support during the process of writing my dissertation, and they taught me the value of social scientific research from very different perspectives that have enriched my work and worldview. At Harvard, I also benefited from a larger intellectual community that challenged my ideas and made me enjoy my work. This community expanded as a result of my subsequent affiliations with the Government Department, the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, the Harvard Academy for International and Area Studies, and the David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies. I cannot mention everyone, but I need to thank
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